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Dear Ms. Snyder:  Comments on April 16, 2001 Exposure Draft 
 
The staff of the Independence Standards Board is pleased to have 
the opportunity to comment on the AICPA Professional Ethics 
Executive Committee’s proposal to modernize its auditor 
independence rules and interpretations.  Our comments reflect solely 
the views of the ISB staff, and do not purport to represent the views 





 We agree with the Committee’s goal of minimizing differences 
between the SEC and AICPA independence rules, generally 
allowing distinctions only where cost-benefit considerations are 
compelling.  The recent codification by the SEC of most of the rules 
into one document will go a long way in assisting firms and 
practitioners to understand the independence rules applicable to 
auditors of public companies.  The new SEC rules, however, take 
some study and use before one is familiar enough with the new 
terminology and format to easily find the answer to a question.  
Knowing that practitioners will have to spend this time familiarizing 
themselves with the SEC rules, does it make sense to revise the 
AICPA rules by forcing conforming changes into the old AICPA 
rule format and perpetuating subtle differences in definition?  It 
would be a positive move forward, we suggest, for audit firms and 
other interested parties to have one set of coherent rules to consult  
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when researching the answer to an independence question, perhaps with shaded 
paragraphs delineating additional restrictions that apply to auditors of public companies.  
While more than one body would be maintaining these rules, they could be published in 
one place – perhaps on an AICPA website for easy and universal accessibility. 
 
 Page 4 – An additional compelling reason for modernizing the rules which should be 
added to your list is that, particularly but not exclusively in the case of family 
relationships and financial interests, the existing rules have had the perverse effect of 
making the auditing profession a less desirable employment opportunity with very little 
offsetting benefit of strengthened independence. 
 
 Page 5 – The first sentence of the penultimate paragraph should be modified to clarify 
that members only must comply with the more restrictive rules when auditing public 
companies. 
 
 We understand that you are considering a Basis for Conclusions section to explain the 
final rules; we agree that would be helpful, and suggest that you include a threat analysis 
supporting the Committee’s conclusions to provide auditors and other interested parties 




Requests for Specific Comments 
 
1. We believe that the definition of covered member includes the appropriate 
individuals and entities, but would use the SEC’s covered person term and groupings to 
better achieve your harmonization goal.  Subtle differences in language and definition 
add unnecessary complexity to the rules. 
  
2. We also believe that the definition of individual in a position to influence the 
attest engagement appropriately includes those individuals who can reasonably be 
expected to influence the attest engagement, but repeat our comment above suggesting 
elimination of subtle differences in language and definition between the AICPA and SEC 
rules. 
 
3. Other senior officials, outside the financial reporting area, have the ability to 
exercise influence over the contents of the financial statements, because their activities 
and decisions have significant financial statement consequences.  Therefore, the 
definition of key position should be expanded to include, for example, the heads of major 
functions (manufacturing, sales, marketing, etc.) and of major subsidiaries or divisions. 
 
4. We suggest the definition of significant influence refer to generally accepted 
accounting principles, rather than APB 18, in case the guidance is changed and APB 18 
withdrawn.  The definition also should be modified to read “[a]n individual or entity has 
significant influence over an entity if the individual or entity meets the criteria......” 
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5. We believe the prohibitions on acting as: 
  
 a promoter, underwriter, or voting trustee; 
 a director, officer, or employee, or in any capacity equivalent to that of a 
member of management; or as 
 a trustee for a client pension or profit-sharing plan  
 
should be extended to all professionals in the firm, rather than only to professionals in the 
office of the lead engagement partner.  The firm should not be auditing a company when 
a firm professional – even from another office – is promoting the company or serving, for 
example, as a director or officer.  It creates both a bias that should be avoided and a major 
appearance issue. 
 
6.  The 5% ownership threshold (as opposed to an ownership level allowing 
significant influence) was adopted by the ISB and the SEC to avoid the appearance 
concern that would be raised by the proxy statement requirement to identify and disclose 
ownership interests at that level or above.  A 5% restriction should be imposed on 
auditors of private companies too, although perhaps for different reasons.  Obtaining an 
investment in a private company usually involves negotiations with management or other 
shareholders, or results from an employment relationship, and in either case a 5% or 
greater interest should be of concern.  Having the same test for public and private 
company audits also has some appeal.   
 
In addition, the proposal should be modified to prohibit two or more firm professionals 
from having investments that collectively would allow them to exert significant influence 
over an audit client if they were to act together.  We would, however, consider this a 
violation only when the investors knew of each other’s investments.   
 
7. We believe that the immediate family of engagement team members should not be 
employed in any position at the client.  The engagement team member should not have a 
stake in protecting the employment of the immediate family member, whatever the 
relative’s involvement with the financial statements.  There is also the possibility of an 
emotional attachment to the employer of a spouse or dependent that is inappropriate, and 
employment of the engagement team’s immediate family members raises significant 
appearance issues.   
 
The exception allowing immediate family members of certain covered members to 
participate in client-sponsored, employment-related retirement, savings, compensation or 
similar plans implies that immediate family members of other covered members are 
prohibited from doing so. We could not find that prohibition in the rules.  The definition 
of client does not include client-sponsored plans, and the definition of financial interests 
does not include interests in these plans. Although we do not believe immediate family 
members of engagement team members should be employed at the client in any position, 
we would not object to their participation in a client-sponsored retirement plan (provided 
such plan is normally offered to all employees in similar positions) if such employment is 
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ultimately permitted.  We would object to immediate family member investments in the 
client via a retirement or similar plan, however, because the threat to the objectivity of 
the related “covered member” would be too great, as would the appearance issue. 
 







 Joint closely held business investment – The definition needs the word “and” after 
“member” to convey the notion that a joint investment is one where both a covered 
member and the client (or its officers, directors, or stockholders that can exercise 
significant influence) have a controlling investment as opposed to one where the client 
and, for example, its officers and directors have control.  In addition, the “individually 
and in any combination” language is not technically correct, as it could be misconstrued 
to mean an investment controlled by the client, for example, in which the covered 




 A.3 – An interest in a closely-held entity normally involves negotiations directly with 
the entity or another shareholder of the entity, in contrast with the impersonal process of 
buying stock in a traded company.  Furthermore, by definition, the number of 
shareholders in a closely-held entity is small, and shareholders often have frequent 
opportunity or need for contact.  Consequently, we believe the familiarity and self-
interest threats, as well as the appearance concern, are too strong to permit the firm or a 
covered member to have any interests in a closely-held entity along with the client, a 
director or officer of the client, or a shareholder who can exercise significant influence 
over the client, regardless of materiality.  We would distinguish between these joint 
activities and situations where a client subsequently, and on its own, invests in a venture 
in which a covered member already holds an interest. 
 
Application of the Independence Rules to a Covered Member’s Immediate Family 
 
 1.b.(i) – We believe materiality should be measured with respect to the net worth of 
both the relative and the covered member.  It is hard for us to imagine an investment that 
is immaterial to the auditor biasing his or her judgment, even if it is material to the 
relative.  The auditor is more likely to assist a close relative financially than compromise 
professional standards for an immaterial amount.  Similarly, an investment that is 
material to the auditor but of no consequence to the close relative is not likely to 
influence the auditor.  Such a dual test would avoid unnecessary independence issues 
such as those involving investments of adult children or of wealthy siblings, without 
compromising objectivity. 
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 1.b.(ii) – We would modify the language to read “[e]nabled the close relative to 




The language used here is excellent; the examples provided, however - close personal and 
business relationships – in many cases pose a real threat to the auditor’s independence, 
and are not merely appearance problems.  
 
 
* * * * * 
 
If you would like to discuss any of these matters, please contact us. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
Arthur Siegel 
